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Abstract:This article contains an analysis of the first instance and appeal decisions of the 
“Rihanna case”.In particular, the authors consider the substantive law of passing off in the 
context of the unauthorised use of a celebrity's image on a Topshop tank vest top. This is 
followed by a discussionof the consequences of the caseforcelebrities, consumers and 
stakeholders in theentertainmentand fashion industries. 
 
Every time you see me it's a different colour, a different shape, a different style. 
....because it really...I/we just go off of instinct. Whatever we feel that very moment, 
we just go for it.  Creatively, fashion is another world for me to get my creativity 
out.12 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1Rihanna quote from the Talk That Talk music video available at www.youtube.com/watch?v=cVTKxwO2UnU 
2 All websites accessed and correct as at 13 February 2015. 
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Introduction 
 
Just as Rihanna says she uses fashion as an outlet for her creativity, the tricky field of 
"image rights"provides ample opportunity for lawyers to demonstrate their own 
resourcefulness, especially in England where there is no sui generis law against 
unauthorised exploitation.The term“imagerights”3is used by the authors to refertocontrol 
over the exploitationofidentifiable attributes of real people.4Absent specific image rights 
legislation, lawyersworking in branding and reputation management must pick through a 
jacket of statutory and common law pockets of law in an attempt to achieve some measure 
of protection for their, often famous, clientele. 
 
In this article, the authors will consider the latestimage-type case in which the global pop 
star and fashionista known as "Rihanna" sued high street retailer, “Topshop”, for 
sellingtank vest tops5 depicting her face without her permission. After examining the first 
instance6 and appeal7 decisions, we will consider theirinfluencein the wider context of 
image rights protection. We will also look at the practical consequences of the case for 
celebrities, consumers and other stakeholders in the entertainment and fashion industries. 
 
 
Background 
The notion of protecting a person'simage from unauthorised exploitation in this country is 
not a new one. It could be said to date back to the early confidence case won by Prince 
                                                 
3 Also known as “personality rights” 
4 Attributes include: name, image, voice, signature, mannerisms and other unique characteristics.The courts tend to 
view fictional characters in a different way: Irvine v Talksport Ltd [2002] EWHC 367 (Ch); [2002] 1 WLR 2355 
(Laddie J) [9] 
5 Hereinafter “vest” 
6Fenty&Ors v Arcadia Group Brands Ltd (t/a Topshop) &Anor [2013] EWHC 2310 (Ch); [2013] WLR(D) 310 
7Fenty&Ors v Arcadia Group Brands Ltd &Anor [2015] EWCA Civ 3 
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Albert who was concerned to protectan etching of the Royal family from unsanctioned 
distribution.8 
 
However, the subsequent development of image rights per se has been stunningly slow in 
this jurisdiction compared to other countries such as the United States, France and 
Germany.Veryclose to home, the first image registration system was launched in 
Guernsey in 2012. 9 In relation to the “image”,you can register ‘the real you’ (the 
'personnage') or ‘the public perception of you’ (the 'personality').1011The extent of image 
protection under this Ordinance is not limited to a particular image,12 although the precise 
scope of protection and effectiveness of enforcement outside the Bailiwick has not yet 
been tested in the courts. 
 
Such discrepancies in legal protection amongst different jurisdictionstend to operate as 
barriers to international trade, especially in the world of entertainment, including sport. As 
Tugendaht QC explains, ‘[w]hen sporting celebrities moved to the UK, to play for English 
teams, they expected the same legal protection for their valuable images, and the same 
income from endorsements.’13 
 
                                                 
8Prince Albert v Strange(1849) 18 LJ Ch 120, 41 ER 1171; see also:Pollard v Photographic (1888) 40 Ch D 345 
9The Image Rights (Bailiwick of Guernsey) Ordinance, 2012.“Image” is defined in section 3 as- 
(a) the name of a personnage or any other name by which a personnage is known,  
(b) the voice, signature, likeness, appearance, silhouette, feature, face, expressions (verbal or facial), gestures, 
mannerisms, and any other distinctive characteristic or personal attribute of a personnage, or 
c) any photograph, illustration, image, picture, moving image or electronic or other representation ("picture") of a 
personage and of no other person, except to the extent that the other person is not identified or singled out in or in 
connection with the use of the picture.  
10Personnage and Personality Explained, Intellectual Property Office - Guernsey Registry, 2012 available at 
http://ipo.guernseyregistry.com/CHttpHandler.ashx?id=79059&p=0 
11There are currently 52 registrations which include artificial entities as well as natural persons such as professional 
tennis player and native Guernesian, Heather Watson, Intellectual Property Office - Guernsey Register at 
www.guernseyregistry.com/ipo. “Rihanna” is not yet registered under the Guernesian image rights system. 
12Unlike registered trade marks. 
13Michael Tugendhat QC [as he was then], ‘Exploitation of Image Rights in the UK’ 29.01.03 available at 
http://fbls.eu/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/2002-Exploitation-of-Image-Rights-in-the-UK-by-Michael-Tugendhat-
QC.pdf, 3 
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In both common and civil law jurisdictions, the unauthorised appropriation of image has 
generally been approached from two perspectives: (1) unfair competition/intellectual 
property and (2) human rights, especially privacy. 14  The English case of Douglas, 15 
concerning the unauthorised publication of wedding photographs, provides an interesting 
hybrid.Both perspectives are applicable due to the rather different interests of and harm 
suffered by the claimants:the privacy of the claimant couple and the commercial 
information purchased from them by the claimant magazine. It was also apparent,from the 
arguments raised by the defendants in this case,that concepts of human dignity and 
commercial interests make uneasy bedfellows. This is also evident in the 
confidence/privacycase,Terry (previously “LNS”) v Persons Unknown,16which concerned 
an application for an interim injunction to restrain the publication of information relating to a 
personal relationship of the then English football captain. Tugendhat J dismissed the 
application, partly on the basis that ‘the nub’17 of the applicant’s complaint was damage to 
his commercial reputation rather than safeguarding his privacy.  
 
Privacy and commercial exploitation have been reconciled in over half the states of the US 
which recognise a well-developed,suigeneris“publicity right”.This is defined as ‘the inherent 
right of every human being to control the commercial use of his or her identity’.18According 
to Thomas McCarthy, the publicity right was ‘carved out of the general right of privacy[...] 
like Eve from Adam's rib.’19 In fact, the true genesis of the right involved years of legal 
wrangling,20not unlike what we are witnessing in England over half a century later. 
                                                 
14Huw Beverley-Smith et al, Privacy, Property and Personality, Civil Law Perspectives on Commercial 
Appropriation(Cambridge University Press 2005)  206 
15Douglas and others v Hello! Ltd and others (No 3)[2007] UKHL 21;  [2008] 1 AC 1 
16 [2010] EWHC 119 (QB); [2010] EMLR 16 
17 ibid [149] 
18J Thomas McCarthy, The Rights of Publicity and Privacy2ndedn (Thomson /West 2008 ) vol 1 [1.3] 
19 ibid [5.8] 
20Culminating in the recognition of a publicity right independent of the right to privacy in a case decided under the 
jurisdiction of New York, Healan Laboratories, Inc v Topps Chewing Gum, Inc 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir 1963); see also 
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Apart from the law of confidence, bolstered by Article 8 of the Human Rights Act 1998 
(HRA), other pockets of limited protection for aspects of image include:data 
protection, 21 copyright, 22 commissioners' right to privacy of certain photographs and 
films,23performers' rights,24 registered trade marks,25advertising standards codes,26trading 
standards, 27  defamation, 28  maliciousfalsehood, 29 unlawful interference with contractual 
relations30and the economic tort of passing off which is the cause of action in the Rihanna 
case.Wewill now consider thepurpose and ingredients of passing off followed by an 
analysis of its application in the Rihanna decisions. 
 
 
Passing Off: Purpose and Ingredients 
In its simplest form, passing off protects the goodwill of one trader from damage caused by 
the misrepresentation(s) of another trader.31Misrepresentation, damage and goodwill are 
therefore the three essential elements of the tort, and are often referred to as the "classical 
                                                                                                                                                                  
David S Wellkowitz et al, Celebrity Rights: Rights of Publicity and Related Rights in the United States and 
Abroad(Carolina Academic Press 2010) Ch 1 Introduction: The Origins of Rights of Publicity 
21 Data Protection Act 1998 
22Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (as amended), Part I 
23 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (as amended), section 85 
24Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (as amended), Part II 
25
 Trade Marks Act 1994. For example, see: UK registration of Alan Titchmarsh name and image (UK00002277288)  
for 12 classes of  product available at  www.ipo.gov.uk/tmcase/Results/1/UK00002277288 
26 For example, see: David Bedford (complainant), Advertising Standards Code Ofcom decision, 27 January 2004 
available at http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/enforcement/advertising-complaints-bulletins/appeal-the-number-david-
bedford/ 
27For example, Trade Descriptions Act 1968 
28 For example, the now discredited, former professional road racing cyclist, Lance Armstrong, successfully used libel 
laws to protect his professional reputation after the Sunday Times published an article suggesting it was right for 
questions about his performance to be both ‘posed and answered’.. Armstrong v Times Newspapers Ltd & Others (No.3) 
[2006] EWHC 1614 (QB); see also Tolley v Fry[1930] 1 KB 467 
29As seen in Kaye v Robertson [1991] FSR 62.  
30Douglas n 15 
31Reddaway v Banham [1896] AC 199 (Lord Halsbury LC) 204. For modern definitions see: (“Advocaat”) Erven 
Warnink Besloten Vennootschap and Another Appellants v J Townend & Sons (Hull) Ltd and Another [1979] 3 WLR 
68; [1979] AC 731; (“Jif Lemon”) Reckitt & Colman v Borden [1990] 1 WLR 491 (HL) 
6 
 
trinity"'32 in its modern application.The tort only applies as between “traders”, but the term 
has been given broad interpretation in the case law.33 It also shields customers from 
deception, albeit indirectly. This dual protection provides a strong justification for the tort. 
The mental state of the defendant is irrelevant as liability is strict, although evidence of 
adefendant's innocence precludes the equitable remedy, account of profits.34The elements 
of passing offinteract with each other,limiting the scope of the tort, as we shall see in the 
next section. 
 
 
Passing Off: the Chaotic ‘Continuum of Elements’35 
One of the advantages of a common law cause of action,such as passing off,is its capacity 
to adapt to modern business practicesand their concomitant deceptions. Described as the 
‘most protean’36 cause of action for unfair trading, it is ‘closely connected to and dependent 
upon what is happening in the market place’.37For example, in Irvine v TalksportLtd,38the 
precursor to Rihanna,LaddieJrecognised the ubiquity of celebrity endorsement 
arrangements. One of the downsides to an ever evolving tortis that the ingredients of 
passing off are contained within a multitude of definitions that derive from precedents. 
Moreover, as Wadlow states in his seminal text: 
                                                 
32Christopher Wadlow, The Law of Passing-Off: Unfair Competition by Misrepresentation 4thedn (Sweet & Maxwell 
2011)para 1-014, 10 
33Mirage Studios v Counter-Feat Clothing Co Ltd [1991] FSR 145. See also: Irvine v Talksport Ltd[2002] EWHC 367 
(Ch); [2002] 1 WLR 2355.  
34W Cornish et al, Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks and Allied Rights 7th edn (Sweet & Maxwell 
2010) 678 citing the Edelsten case (1863) 1 De GJ & S 184 
35Clive Lawrence, Brands: Law, Practice and Precedents (Jordan’s Ltd 2008) 166 
36Erven Warnink Besloten Vennootschap and Another Appellants v J Townend & Sons (Hull) Ltd and Another [1979] 3 
WLR 68; [1979] AC 731 (Diplock LJ) 240 
37Irvine v Talksport Ltd [2002] EWHC 367 (Ch); [2002] 1 WLR 2355 (Laddie J) [13]. For example, passing off 
wasinvoked to deal with early internet domain name cybersquatting cases such asBritish Telecommunications Plc v One 
in a Million Ltd [1998] FSR 265; Direct Line Group Limited v Direct Line Estate Agency Ltd [1997] FSR 374; Glaxo 
Plc v Glaxo-Wellcome Limited [1996] FSR 388 
38[2002] EWHC 367 (Ch); [2002] 1 WLR 2355: This case concerned the digital manipulation of a photograph of Eddie 
Irvine, a successful, Formula 1 racing driver. The mobile 'phone Mr Irvine was holding to his ear in the original picture 
was replaced with a radio prominently displaying the defendant's brand. 
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The cause of action has suffered from a lack of consistent and precise vocabulary 
to describe its fundamental legal concepts. Certain recurrent words appear to be 
used as if they were terms of art, but on closer inspection turn out to bear a variety 
of inconsistent meanings which are not always correctly distinguished.3940 
 
 
The modern approach is the classical trinity stated above which was applied in both the 
first instance and appeal decisions of Rihanna. It was necessary for Rihanna's lawyers to 
bring to the court sufficient evidence to satisfy each inter-related element of the classical 
trinity to the satisfaction of the court on a balance of probabilities. It is, therefore, worth 
considering each element in more detail, recognising the strong interaction between them, 
before discussing their application to the facts of Rihanna. 
 
 
 
The First Element: Goodwill 
Goodwillencapsulates brand loyalty. It has been defined as‘[t]he attractive force which 
brings in custom’.41 In today’s celebrity culture, fame itself is an attractive force which 
draws in the consumer. It is for this reason that traders often ask well known personalities 
topromote their products, hoping that the popularity of the celebrity will rub off on their 
product (the ‘halo effect’42).43Various aspects of a star’s personality, including his or her 
physical image, are also used in merchandising. 
 
In the majority of passing off cases, the claimanttradesundera sign or “badge” 
whichissufficientlydistinctive to be recognisedbyconsumersas an indicator of the 
                                                 
39 Wadlow, n 32  [1-29] 17 
40Indeed, misrepresentation is sometimes conflated with misappropriation in celebrity cases: Hazel Carty, ‘Passing Off: 
frameworks of liability debated’ (2012) IPQ (2) 106 
41Inland Revenue Commissioners v Muller &Co's Margarine Ltd[1901] AC 217 (HL), 224  
42Edward L Thorndike, ‘A constant error in psychological ratings’, Journal of Applied Psychology (1920)4 (1) 25–29, 
28 
43Indeed, Rihanna’s endorsement deals currently span ten years starting from her very first endorsement in perfume in 
October 2005, expanding to fashion and men’s aftershave. 
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claimant'sproducts44; the more distinctive the badge the easier it is to prove passing off if 
the defendant uses a similar badge on the defendant's product. The badge is often a 
name, a logo or the “get-up”(e.g. packaging) of a product. In Rihanna, it is her face. 
However, it is important to recognise that, in the context of passing off, unlike registered 
trade mark protection, it is not the badgeper se which is protected.Rather, it is the goodwill 
appurtenant to the badge which is, in turn, inextricably linked to the claimant's underlying 
business.45 
 
Goodwill, itself, is a form of property46and it has been suggested that the continuum of the 
“classical trinity” may be undermined by the substitution of “reputation” for “goodwill”.Hazel 
Carty suggests, ‘though reputation lurks behind goodwill…such substitution of concepts 
may weaken the linkage of the trinity ingredients’. 47 Yet the terms are used 
interchangeably.48When assessing the third element (damage) in Rihanna, the trial judge 
referred to the claimant's ‘loss of control over her reputation in the fashion sphere.’49In fact, 
reputation gives rise to a broader, non-proprietary right which can exist independently of a 
business,50 although injury to reputation can obviously have an adverse effect on goodwill. 
                                                 
44In this article, the term 'product' covers goods and services. 
45Burberry’s v Cording [1900] 26 RPC 693 (Parker J); cited inIrvine v Talksport Ltd [2002] EWHC 367 (Ch); [2002] 1 
WLR 2355 (Laddie J) [31]. See also: Inland Revenue Commissioners v Muller [1901] AC 217 (Lord Macnaghton) 
223;Star Industrial Company Limited v Yap KweeKor (Trading As New Star Industrial Company) [1976] FSR 256 
(PC), (Lord Diplock) 269 
46Fage UK Ltd v Chobani UK Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 5; [2014] ETMR 26 (Lewison LJ) [123]  
47Hazel Carty, ‘Passing Off: frameworks of liability debated’ (2012) IPQ (2) 106, 108 
48Indeed, Lord Oliver refers to ‘goodwill or reputation' in “Jif Lemon”(Reckitt & Colman v Borden[1990] 1 WLR 491 
(HL) (“Jif Lemon”)(Lord Oliver) 499 where the distinctive lemon-shaped packaging of the claimant’s lemon juice was 
held to have been misrepresented by a similar lemon shaped packaging); as does Nourse LJ in “Parma Ham” 
(Consorzio del Prosciutto di Parma v Marks & Spencer Plc [1991] RPC 351 (CA) (Nourse LJ) 368. Marks & Spencer 
Ltd marketed hamas “Parma Ham” even though it had been sliced and packed in the UK, rather than in the Parma 
region as required under Italian law. Hence, it was a non-genuine “Parma Ham” product, similar to the Greek yoghurt in 
Fage n 45); and Laddie J in Irvine(n 37 (Laddie J) [34]) 
49Fenty n 6 [74] (authors’ emphasis) 
50For example, Rihanna almost lost her goodwill for the purpose of celebrity endorsement when she reconciled with 
musician, Chris Brown, after he assaulted her (Katrina K Wheeler, ‘Rihanna's endorsements reportedly in danger; Gucci 
ad may not be renewed (watch video/documentary)’ (14 Mar 2009, US) available at 
www.examiner.com/article/rihanna-s-endorsements-reportedly-danger-gucci-ad-may-not-be-renewed-watch-video-
documentary).  However, it is unlikely this would have affected her reputation as a super star in the eyes of the relevant 
consumer. 
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The fuzziness of the judges' distinction between the concepts of goodwill and reputation in 
passing off cases suits the protection of a celebrity'simage. 
 
 
 
The Second Element: Misrepresentation 
The classic misrepresentation is that the defendant does a positive act to make it appear 
that the defendant's product originates from the claimant.51The cause of action has also 
evolved to protect against subtler forms of deception such asthe defendant suggesting a 
“relevant connection” to the claimant.52 That said, for many years, passing off claims failed 
in relation to “character merchandising”53and “false endorsement” cases:the claimants 
were unable to satisfy the sine qua nonof the claimant and defendant being commercially 
involved in the 'same field of activity'.54Thesubsequent dismantling of this hurdle, at least 
as an absolute requirement, was confirmed inIrvine.55 This expands the tort considerably 
as the parties no longer need to be direct competitors in the marketplace. The judge also 
took a broad view of the scope of“relevant connection”.56 
 
Unlike US-style publicity rights, the purest formof passing off is limited to 
misrepresentation, not misappropriation on its own. Yet, Laddie J stated that ‘…Mr Irvine 
has a property right in his goodwill which he can protect from unlicensed appropriation 
consisting of a false claim…’.57The use of “(mis)appropriation” terminology has been 
                                                 
51Reddaway n 31 
52Such as quality control under licence; see: BulmerLtdvJBollingerSA (No 3) [1978] RPC 79 (Buckley LJ) 99 and (Goff 
LJ) 177. See also: Harrods v Harrodian School [1996] RPC 697 (Millet LJ)713 re sufficiency of “relevant connection”.  
53Elvis Presley Trade Marks [1999] RPC 567 (Simon Brown LJ) 597  
54 For a potted history in the area of a “common field of activity” see: McCulloch v May (1947) 65 R.P.C. 58;Wombles 
Ltd v Wombles Skips Ltd [1975] FSR. 488; Lyngstad v Anabas Products Ltd[1977] FSR 62.  
55 It was dispensed with in a series of cases culminating in Lego Systems A/S v Lego M Lemelstrich Ltd[1983] FSR 155; 
and the false endorsement case of Irvine n 37 [29] 
56In contrast to Harrods n 52 where the majority subscribed to a narrow view in the requiring quality control. 
57Irvine n 37 (Laddie J) [75] (authors’ emphasis), embracing the principles enunciated in Henderson v Radio 
Corporation Pty Ltd [1969] RPC 218in theHigh Court of New South Wales sitting in its appellate jurisdiction. 
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criticised.Carty claims thatit compromises the internal balance of the classical trinity.58 In 
other words, passing off is wholly associated with the deception that lies at the heart of 
misrepresentation, not the defendant’s capacity to be unjustly enriched by freeriding on the 
claimant’s goodwill. Indeed, according to the Rt Hon Sir Robin Jacobet al: 
...the heart of this wrong is telling lies to the public. If the court thinks that is going 
on, it is going to want to stop it - in reality this general rule is often more important 
than all the technical rules of the law of registered trade marks put together.59 
 
Telling words indeed. Sir Robin has made his views regarding “misappropriation” 
crystalclear: ‘to use the word in the context of a debate about the limits of the tort of 
passing off and its interface with legitimate trade is at best muddling and at worst 
tendentious’.60 Wadlow, however, believes that misappropriation has always been at the 
very heart of passing off.61 Indeed, it is the inherent pecuniary value of the claimant’s 
proprietary62 interest in goodwill and the ‘lustre of association’63that the defendants wish to 
“cash in on”. As stated in Irvine, ‘the law will vindicate the claimant’s exclusive right to the 
reputation or goodwill. It will not allow others to so use goodwill as to reduce, blur or 
diminish its exclusivity’.64This reasoning inIrvine represents a distinct step forward on the 
evolutionary pathway to image rights protection in England via an expanded concept of 
passing off, influenced by concepts of misappropriation and dilution. 
                                                 
58Carty n 47 
59 Robin Jacob LJ [as he was then] et al, A Guidebook to Intellectual Property: Patents, Trade Marks, Copyright and 
Designs 5thedn (Sweet and Maxwell 2004) 124  
60L'Oréal V Bellure[2007] EWCA Civ 969; [2008] RPC 8 (Jacob LJ) [160]; see also: Hodgkinson FSR 169 (Jacob LJ) 
175 
61 Dialogue between Wadlow and Carty see: Christopher Wadlow, ‘Passing off at the crossroads again: a review article 
for Hazel Carty, An Analysis of the Economic Torts’(2011) 33(7) EIPR 447, 449-50; Hazel Carty, ‘Passing off: 
frameworks of liability debated’ (2012) IPQ (2) 106 
62 ‘In the traditional perception of common law, one of the irreducible components of a proprietary right is a general 
entitlement to exclude others from enjoyment of, or from interfering with one's own mode of enjoyment of, the resource 
in which the property is claimed’(Kevin Gray et al, Land Law 4thedn (Oxford University Press 2007) 41); Laddie J in 
Irvine [34]: ‘instead of benefiting from exclusive rights to his property, the latter now finds that someone else is 
squatting on it’. It follows that the proprietary right in goodwill should cover not only damage (or likelihood of 
damage), but also misappropriation of goodwill. For a contrary view setting out the repugnance for a ‘property right’ 
approach and the danger of creating ‘obnoxious monopoly’, see: Wadlow n 62, 453 
63Transcript of Court of Appeal hearing (day 1) 
64Irvine n 37 [38]. On this point the authors are keenly aware of the contention surrounding the use of words like “blur” 
in passing off claims which also suggest “dilution”. Their place more rightly belongs in that of unfair competition. 
However, it is yet another example of how passing off is expanding when image-related claims are at issue and how 
terminology overlaps in this complex area of law. See also: Wadlow n 62, 453 
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The Third Element: Damage 
Actual (or the likelihood of) damage to the goodwill caused by misrepresentation is the 
third element which completes the classical trinity. In support of the continuum theory, if 
the first two elements of the classical trinity are successfully proven, the third will generally 
follow.65Wadlow argues that the expansion of the tort to cover non-competing66traders 
extends it into the realms of unjust enrichment and speculative damage. He questions 
whether Mr Irvine should have been compensated for the loss of an opportunity he may 
not have wished to take. However, the remedy in image-type cases is limited: ‘if the 
[claimant] is in the business of licensing out his name or image, the law so far has only 
recognized damage in the form of lost royalties and licensing fees’.67 
 
Through the advancement of judicial interpretation of the classical trinity in the context of 
commodification of celebrities, it seems inevitable that the courts will recognise that 
damage extends beyond the mere loss of opportunity to endorse a rival product or 
diversion of sales away from official merchandise. In Irvine, Laddie J stated that had the 
law of passing off not developed sufficiently to protect against false endorsements, it would 
have been necessary to consider the effect of Articles 8 and 10 HRA to ‘give  the final 
impetus’ to reach the desired result.68Human rights considerations may also extend the 
scope of contemplated loss in the future. The first instance decision in Rihanna refers to 
                                                 
65Fentyn 6 [33] 
66 This was because there is no longer a requirement for a common field of activity and the parties need not be in direct 
competition with each other. 
67Peter M Bryniczka, ‘Irvine v Talksport Ltd: Snatching Victory from the Jaws of Defeat – English Law Now Offers 
Better Protection of Celebrities’ Rights’ (2004) 11 Sports Law, J, 171, 180 
68Irvine n 37 (Laddie J) [77], citing Sedley LJ in Douglas v Hello! [2001] FSR 732 
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‘loss of control of reputation’ under the heading “damage”which also amplifies the extent of 
injury envisaged.69 
 
In summary, the looser the definitions of the classical trinity elements, the wider the scope 
of the tort.Pressure to extend its application can be attributed to the lack of a‘general unfair 
competition’law which was called for in submissions informing theGowers Review of 
Intellectual Property. 70 Gowersrecognised that there was insufficient protection from 
misappropriation for ‘brands and designs’. 71 Contrarily, JacobLJ warned that the 
introduction of a general tort of unfair competition would be like letting ‘the genie out of the 
bottle’ because ‘it would be of wholly uncertain scope’.72It might be instructive to consider 
the German experience.73 
 
We will now rehearse the facts ofRihanna in some detail as they are crucial to the 
outcome. 
 
 
 
The Rihanna Case: Summary of Facts  
Rihanna, a global pop star and ‘fashion icon’,74  was “papped” during the shooting of 
her“We Found Love”music video in September 2011. The corresponding single was 
subsequently released on her Talk That Talk album on 18 November 2011. Thefilming 
attracted global publicity.7576 
                                                 
69Fentyn 6 [74] (there is no damages award to date in Rihanna) 
70Gowers Review of Intellectual Property (December 2006) [5.86] available at 
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/228849/0118404830.pdf 
71ibid [5.84] 
72L'Orealn 60; [2008] ECC 5 (Jacob LJ) [161] 
73Germany introduced a new Unfair Competition Act in July 2004 to modernise its law to comply with European Union 
requirements:  Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb vom 3. Juli 2004 (BGBl. I 2004 32/1414). 
74Fentyn 6 [45] 
75John Burns and Francesca Angelini, ‘Rude boy? You’re a fine one to talk’ The Sunday Times (2 Oct 2011, London) 
www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/ireland/article789204.ece 
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Topshop is a major fashion retail chain which has been described as ‘signifying youth and 
modernity and evoking cool London’.77The paparazzo licensed use of the photographto 
Topshop's supplier,hencethere was no copyright infringement. Although Rihanna did not 
consent to the photograph being taken, neither privacy nor breach of confidence were 
pleaded in the main proceedings. 
 
On 6March 2012, Topshopbegansellingonline and in its storesa number of vestseach 
featuring a different living being.One of these wasthe vest in issue which featuredthe 
“papped” image of Rihanna.Thepassing offclaim,broughtby Rihanna and her trading 
companies78against the Arcadia Group,79was issued in the High Court on 30 March 
2012.80 
 
 
 
The Rihanna Case: First Instance Decision 
In the High Court (Ch) between 17 and 21 July 2013, Birss J relied on the classical trinity 
of elements discussed above. It was easy for the Claimant to establish ample goodwillby 
reference to Rihanna'smusic sales, tours,awards, extensive merchandising and 
endorsement activities. She also produced collaborative clothing collections with other 
enterprises such as fashion designer, Armani. At the time thevest was put on sale, she 
                                                                                                                                                                  
76 This was after it was reported that, on the 26 September, the owner of the property where the music video was being 
recorded insisted that the singer leave his property. Allegedly, he did not approve of her risqué conduct in his corn field 
(Caroline Westbrook, ‘Rihanna fans blast farmer who asked singer to leave his land’ Metro (3 Oct 2011, London) 
available at http://metro.co.uk/2011/10/03/rihanna-fans-blast-farmer-who-asked-singer-to-leave-his-land-170420/). The 
landowner received hatemail whilst other Rihanna fans contacted him offering to buy corn touched by the super star 
(Yasmin Alibhai-brown, ‘Farmer Graham was right to stand up to Rihanna's antics’ Mail Online (29 Sep 2011, London) 
available at  www.dailymail.co.uk/femail/article-2043026/Rihanna-We-Found-Love-video-Farmer-Alan-Graham-right-
stand-her.html)  
77Fenty(CA) n 7(Kitchin LJ) [12] 
78 Hereinafter known as "the Claimant" 
79 Trading as Topshop and hereinafter known as "the Defendant" 
80Claimant issues HC proceedings against Arcadia Group Brands available at Alex Rees, ‘RiRi takes on Topshop’ 
Scribd (23 May 2013, San Francisco) available at www.scribd.com/doc/143299252/Fenty-v-Arcadia-Group-Brands 
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also had a “tie-up” with Topshop rival, River Island, albeit pre-launch. The most 
contentious issue was the misrepresentation element of the classical trinity. There was no 
evidence of actual confusion which Birss J ruled was ‘desirable but not 
determinative’.81However, he found for Rihanna predominantly due to the public links 
between Topshop and famous stars in general and, more importantly, Rihanna in 
particular.82 
 
Topshop had previously attempted to connect itself to Rihanna by running a national 
competition offering consumers the chance to win a personal styling consultation with her 
in its flagship store. Its staff had also endeavoured to make it known when the super star 
was shopping there.  Indeed, it was the parties’ ‘symbiotic’83 relationship which was fatal to 
Topshop’s defence. In the context of the factual matrix of Rihanna’s music and fashion 
business and the Topshop connection, Birss J found that ‘the sale of this image of this 
person on this garment by this shop in these circumstances’84deviated from the fact that 
‘the mere sale by a trader of a t-shirt bearing the image of a famous person was not, 
without more, an act of passing off’.85 
 
The particular image used also affected the outcome;itwas‘striking’ according to Birss 
J.86The larger than life-sized face and shoulders of Rihanna occupied most of the front of 
the vest and in particular, the hair “up do” with the scarfwas highly distinctive.87It had been 
taken during a highly publicised video shoot; similar images were included on an album 
                                                 
81Fenty n 6 [50] 
82ibid [71] 
83Fenty n 6 [60] 
84ibid [75] 
85ibid 
86Fenty n 6 [67]. The image shows Rihanna ‘face on’ to the camera. It is a posed shot featuring a very similar fashion 
style to those included in the cover booklet of the CD album and approximately 10 seconds of the song's video.Her hair 
is tied up with a scarf and the two straps of a ‘bralet’ are just discernible. 
87Fenty n 6 [67] 
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cover which reached number ten of the hundred top selling albums of 201188 whilst the 
single to which the actual photograph relates topped charts in twenty-seven countries 
worldwide. 89 Furthermore,thealbum with the featured imagecoincided with the singer's 
“Loud” tour which ranked at number sevenof the 25 best-selling tours worldwideof 2011.90 
Rihanna made history when her tour sold out on allten nights at the O2 arena in 
London.91Crucial to the first instance decision ‘was the relationship between this image 
and the images of Rihanna for the album and the video shoot’92which Birss J thought 
would be noticed by the “relevant consumer”.9394 He concluded that ‘fans are particularly 
likely to think that the image came from promotional material for the album, single or 
video’.95Upon viewing the video, the authors noted that Rihanna’s get-up in the “We Found 
Love” four minute video changes constantly. The get-up in issue (the bralet, headscarf and 
up-do) features for approximately ten seconds. However, it could be argued that this is 
qualitatively sufficient if it is the most recognisable part of the relevant video.96 
 
In terms of damage, the judge found that Rihanna suffered ‘a loss of control over her 
reputation in the fashion sphere’ and that ‘[s]ales [were] lost to her merchandising 
business’.97Although the Claimant sought a broad injunction prohibiting Topshop from 
selling any Rihanna image on any clothing, Birss Jdeemed that an injunction in qualified 
form would suffice: Topshop was not to market a T-shirt bearing this particular image 
                                                 
88Dan Lane, ‘The Top 20 biggest selling albums of 2011 revealed!’ (2 Jan 2012, UK) available at 
www.officialcharts.com/chart-news/the-top-20-biggest-selling-albums-of-2011-revealed/ 
89Author and publisher unknown, available at http://acharts.us/song/65699 
90Pollstar (US) available at www.webcitation.org/64I05wGYs. It was the most sold out show for a female artist in the 
venue's history. 
91Capital FM, ‘Rihanna Breaks O2 Arena Record With Final 'Loud' Tour Gig’ Capital FM (22 December 2011, 
London) available at www.capitalfm.com/artists/rihanna/news/o2-arena-record/ 
92Fenty n 6 [69] 
93 Her female fans aged 13 to 30 
94Fenty n 6 [61] 
95Fenty&Ors v Arcadia Group Brands Ltd &Anor [2013] EWHC 1945; [2013] FSR 37 [83] [expert evidence hearing 
before first instance] 
96Akin to the concept of substantiality in copyright law. 
97Fenty n 6 [74] 
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‘without clearlyinforming prospective purchasers that the garment [had] not been approved 
by or on behalf of [Rihanna].'98 
 
 
The Rihanna Case: the Appeal 
The main appeal was heard by three Lord Justices 99 on 18 and 19 November 
2014.100Displayed in Court 68 of the Court of Appeal, amongst 18 celebrity and “non-
entity” imageTopshop vests, was the now infamous ‘boyfriend style tank’ 101  vest top 
bearing Rihanna’s image. Immediately before the hearing commenced, it was separated 
from the others (with which it was sold at the time)102 as the subject of the appeal by the 
high street giant.103 
 
 
 
 
Creation of an Image Right Monopoly through Assumption of Undisclosed Licences 
It is well established that ‘there is today in England no such thing as a free standing 
general right by a famous person (or anyone else) to control the reproduction of their 
image’. 104  The fundamental argument of the Appellant was that the court should not 
derogate from that legal principle by allowing a passing off claim to succeed on the basis 
of the erroneous assumptionof the existence of an “undisclosed licence” or similar 
association; especially where there was no indication of such licence on the part of the 
Appellant. ‘If you start from the premise that there are no image rights, you must remain 
                                                 
98Transcript of Court of Appeal hearing (day 1) 
99Richards, Kitchin and Underhill LJ 
100There was also a “costs” appeal held after the main appeal wherein Rihanna succeeded against Topshop: Fenty v 
Arcadia Group Brands Ltd[2015] EWCA Civ 38 
101Fenty n 6 [47] 
102The same substrate with a parrot whose provenance is unknown and the music artist, Prince, and others 
103Hereinafter, Arcadia Group/Topshop will be referred to as "the Appellant" and Rihanna (and her trading companies) 
as "the Respondent". 
104Fenty n 6 [2]; see also: Elvis n 53; Douglas n 15 
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loyal to that premise’.105In his submission, Geoffrey Hobbs QC, for theAppellant,illustrated 
the point by analogy to a toll bridge: 
The right to levy a toll does not follow simply because the people you encourage to 
pay the toll are induced to pay it because they (wrongly) assume you have the right 
to impose it. That right has to be established first. Otherwise the argument becomes 
circular. Hence, you cannot then avoid the creation of a monopoly.106 
 
Kitchin LJ regarded this submission as tantamount to claiming ‘a positive right to market 
goods bearing an image even if the use of that image in particular circumstances to 
particular customers gives rise to a misrepresentation’.107The argument was dismissed as 
it would sanction deceptive practices.108 Surprisingly, the undisclosed licence point was 
not addressed directly and yet, it is precisely that point which creates the potential for 
paradox. Only time will tell but, following this precedent, the authors would not be 
surprised to see alleged assumptions of undisclosed licencesand associations cropping up 
everywhere in future.This may well be the evolutionary pathway which takes us a step 
further towards an image right monopoly, albeit limited in scope and one which the Court 
of Appeal suggested can be mitigated by the use of disclaimers.109 It is the authors’ 
contention that this flies in the face of their application of the European Court’s ruling in 
Arsenal v Reed. 110 Although this was a case concerning registered trade marks, the 
rationale for the appeal decision in Arsenal mirrors Rihanna. In other words, disclaimers 
may dispel confusion in relation to the original point of sale, but may not be sufficient to 
prevent deception in the context of wider circulation when the goods are taken away.111 
Essentially, this affects ‘the ability of the…[badge] to guarantee the origin of the goods’.112 
Furthermore, this also disregards entirely the view of Jacob J in Asprey: ‘[d]isclaimers to 
                                                 
105ibid 
106Transcript of Court of Appeal hearing (day 1) 
107Fenty (CA) n 7 [48] 
108 ibid 
109Defendant must always do enough to avoid deception to escape liability: Hodgkinson& Corby Ltd and Another v 
Wards Mobility Services Ltd [1994] 1 WLR 1564 (Jacob J as he was then) 1572 
110 [2003] EWCA Civ 96; [2003] 2 CMLR 25. This case concerned the sale of unlicensed football merchandise in 
relation to trade mark infringement and passing off.  
111Arsenal v Reed[2003] EWCA Civ 96; [2003] 2 CMLR 25 (Aldous LJ) [43]-[48] 
112 ibid [45] 
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avoid confusion which would otherwise occur unless they are massive and omnipresent, 
hardly ever work’.113Indeed, evidence was presented in Jif Lemon which suggested that 
disclaimer labels were insufficient to avoid deception; consumers generally disregard them 
as they are less prominent than other features of the product. Labels are also discarded 
after purchase and are hardly memorable.114Unless any disclaimer is as permanent and 
prominent as the badge itself,it is unlikely to quell the likelihood of deception.115 
 
 
‘Origin Neutral’ Starting Point / Lack of Distinctiveness 
According to Hobbs QC, if there is no inherent proprietary right over an imageper se, the 
starting point is that the image is ‘origin neutral’.116He submitted that the Respondent had 
not produced evidence that, as a badge, the relevant image was sufficiently distinctive to 
individualiseit to Rihanna's business.117Although he accepted that Rihanna is well known 
and widely recognised as a person, he maintained this was a get-up case. The image 
forms part of the traded article itself, like the ‘millions and millions’ 118 of other such 
unauthorisedmerchandise featuring the singer; it is not an indicator of source or 
connection with Rihanna's business. Essentially, consumers buy it because they like the 
look of it and it is trendy, not because it conveys a message of provenance.As Laddie J 
commented in Irvine, the purpose of merchandising enables consumers to buy products 
depicting a subject, be it film characters, music stars or‘some other famous person such as 
the late Diana, Princess of Wales thatthey find enjoyable’ and wish to remember.119 
                                                 
113Asprey and Garrard Ltd v WRA (Guns) Ltd [2002] FSR 30 (Jacob J) [26] 483-4. This case concerned a family 
member who endeavoured to use the family name “Asprey” (known worldwide for its association with luxury goods) as 
a sign for marketing guns. The defendant’s company could not plead an ‘own name’ defence and the court held that its 
use was deceptive. 
114Jif Lemon n 48 (Jauncey LJ) 516 
115ibid (Bridge LJ) 495 
116Transcript of Court of Appeal hearing (day 1) 
117Jif Lemon n 48 (Oliver J) 406 
118Transcript of Court of Appeal hearing (day 1) 
119Irvine n 37 [9] 
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Kitchin LJ dismissed the origin neutral argument on the basis that it ‘would require this 
court to shut its eyes to [the] reality’120 of previous associations between Topshop and 
Rihanna.Where there are previous tie-ups with a celebrity, traders will have to be extra 
careful. 
 
 
 
Misrepresentation by Omission 
 
The second element of the trinity,misrepresentation,is not sufficient on its own: it must be 
material 121  and operative. In court, the two questions posed by Jacob J in 
Hodgkinson122were considered in the context of the instant facts: (1) has the Respondent 
proved that this image of Rihanna is a crucial point of reference for those who want a 
Rihanna-authorised vest? and (2) has it proved that persons wishing to buy an authorised 
vest are likely to be misled into buying the vest inissue?Howe QC for the Respondent 
stated that ‘you have to take the public as you find them’.123In other words, it is necessary 
to enter the mindset of 13 to 30 year old female Rihanna fans who shop at Topshop. The 
entries to the styling competition provide some insight into that mindset:  
 
‘I want to get this thing [styling consultation] because Rihanna is so inspirational’ 
‘I’m hoping Rihanna can spice me up a little and bring my sparkle back’ 
                                                 
120Fenty (CA) n 7 [50] 
121Lack of materiality caused the claim to fail in Halliwell v Panini (Unreported, High Court, Chancery Division, 6 June 
1997). The globally-known pop group phenomenon, the "Spice Girls" endeavoured to obtain an injunction preventing 
Panini from distributing an unauthorised sticker collection, called "The Fab Five," featuring their images. See also: 
Hayley Stallard, ‘The Right of Publicity in the United Kingdom’ 18 Loy LA Ent L Rev 565 (1998). 
Available at http://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/elr/vol18/iss3/7 
122Hodgkinson n 109 
123Transcript of Court of Appeal hearing (day 1) 
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‘She is a true style icon, who many people can learn from’.124 
 
Addressing the first question, having regard to that target market, the Lord Justices appear 
to have been convinced that asufficient number of fans would recognise the particular 
image used on the vest due to the album cover and video shoot. Such recognition could 
leadthem toassume it was endorsed by Rihanna, although there was no evidence that it 
had.125 This is notwithstanding the finding by Birss J at first instance that the vest is 
actually a fashion garment,not the type of T-shirt normally associated with music 
tours.126The risk of this confusion was increased by the contemporaneity of the release of 
the album, the hype surrounding the filming of the music video and the sell-out tour and 
the sale of the vest.It was offset, to some extent, by the lack of her registered trade mark 
logo, (the ‘R’ slash) , ontheswing tag or other indiciaof officialdom which, at first 
instance,Birss J recognised was ‘[a] very important point in [Topshop’s] 
favour’.127However, this did not negatethe risk of the likelihood of confusion,128 amplified 
by the previous trade connections between the parties and the fact that Topshop was, and 
is, a major player in the context of celebrity endorsements. Ironically, Topshop is a victim 
of its own success and reputation. It is ‘not a market stall’ 129 which leaves it at a 
disadvantage in these circumstances. As Hobbs QC submitted in the appeal: 
 
If we accept that a party who has had a previous tie-up with an artist/celebrity 
cannot sell anything with the image of that celebrity, then this creates a disability on 
that party against someone who has never had a tie-up and can freely sell the same 
image.130 
 
                                                 
124Fenty (CA) n 7 [51] 
125 ibid [63] 
126Fenty n 6 [47] 
127 ibid [64] 
128Although confusion is not, in itself, determinative of misrepresentation in passing off (Fenty n 6 [50]) 
129 ibid[55] 
130Transcript of Court of Appeal hearing (day 1) 
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Hobbs QC also relied on the evidence of Ms Kaikobad (for River Island) and pointed out 
that: 
If you have some form of tie-up with one of the world’s leading celebrities, you don’t 
just sit mute about it. You stand there and you trumpet it from the rooftops. You 
have a big splash; you make it positively known that you have that tie-up.131 
 
Hobbs QCalso made the point that it is Topshop's failure to take positive steps to make it 
clear that the vest was unofficial that constituted the misrepresentation. In other words, it 
was amisrepresentation by omission. This argument was run in Halliwell 17 years earlier 
but, in that case, the judges agreed that the lack of indicia representing that the stickers 
were official was fatal to a finding of misrepresentation. 132 This suggests that 
Rihannamoves us towards greater protection for celebrity image. However, does this place 
too high a burden on traders? Will it adversely affect competition, the ‘mainspring of the 
economy’?133 
 
The second Hodgkinson question was also answeredin the affirmative i.e. that Rihanna's 
“apparent” approval of the vest would have induced a not insignificant number of her fans 
to buy it. However, absentanyevidence of actual confusion or, indeed, any evidence that 
the authenticity of the vest was a motivating factor in the purchasers' decision to buy it, 
there appears to be a “leap of faith” to the proposition that the allegiance of fans to 
Rihanna played any part in their decision to buy the vest. Indeed music piracy 
analyticssuggest otherwise.134 
 
                                                 
131ibid 
132Halliwell n 121. Again, this disregards both Jacob J in Aspreyn 112 and the European Court as applied by the CA in 
Arsenal n 111. 
133L'Oreal n 60 (Jacob LJ) [141] 
134Rihanna was the world's second most pirated music artist in 2013 according to a Musicmetric analysis of data from 
peer-to-peer file sharing on Bit Torrent. Her music was downloaded more than 5m times over the course of the 
year.JamesTitcomb, ‘Bruno Mars and Rihanna most pirated artists in 2013’ The Telegraph (30 Dec 2013, London) 
available at www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/internet/10541876/Bruno-Mars-and-Rihanna-most-pirated-artists-in-
2013.html 
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Merchandising or Endorsement? 
 
Hobbs QC argued that Birss J wrongly treated this as an endorsement case whereas, in 
contradistinction to Irvine, it is a merchandising case. Reference was made toLaddie J's 
distinction between the two inIrvine: 
When someone endorses a product...he tells the relevant public that he approves of 
a product or is happy to be associated with it whereas merchandising involves 
exploiting images ...which have become famous.135 
 
The authors have some sympathy with the view of Hobbs QCasthe facts in this case seem 
more inkeeping with merchandising than endorsement; the image ofRihanna herself forms 
part of the product. The sales figures of 12,000 units demonstrate that the presence of the 
image undoubtedly made the vest attractive to its target audience.136This is not sufficient 
on its own: Hobbs QC relied on dicta which suggest that, in a merchandising case such as 
this, it is necessary to establish that the consumer is aware of the claimant's practice of 
granting licenses to use images;137moreover those licenses guarantee quality. In other 
words, ‘the relevant connection must be one by which the plaintiffs would be taken by the 
public to have made themselves responsible for the quality of the defendant's goods or 
services’. 138  The Court of Appeal judges endorsed Birss J’s view that Topshop had 
misrepresented a connection of the relevant kind i.e. that Rihanna was ‘materially 
responsible’ for the quality of the vests.139 
 
                                                 
135Irvine n 37 [9] 
136Fenty(CA) n 7 [12] 
137Bulmer n 52 (Goff LJ) 11  
138Harrods n 52 (Millet LJ) 712-3 
139Fenty(CA) n 7 [61] 
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In this case, we are confronted withan indistinct borderline between merchandise and 
endorsement. The vest is third party Rihanna merchandise140but,as this case shows, it is 
possible for merchandise to carry the perception of endorsement. The precise facts in 
Rihannaappear to have created a hybrid situation making it the first of its kind to be 
scrutinised by the Court of Appeal in recent times. The authors agree with McCarthy: ‘[a] 
rigid classification [of endorsement and merchandising activities] would risk stagnation and 
hamper development of the law, particularly as regards future evolution of commercial or 
social practices.’ 141  Either way, Rihannasignificantly lowers the bar to proving 
misrepresentation in false merchandise and, indeed, false endorsement passing off 
cases.142 
 
 
Damage 
A somewhat surprising complaint from Rihanna was that the image was unflattering.143 
Surely an unflattering image is less likely to be conceived as an authorised image? 
Notwithstanding this, it could increase the damage suffered as highlighted by Catherine 
Zeta JonesinDouglas144 when she asserted that unflattering images were damaging to her 
career prospects as an actress, hence the need to control the mediated image.  
 
Rihanna had to demonstrate that she suffered, or in a quiatimet action, was likely to suffer 
damage by reason of the erroneous belief engendered by Topshop’smisrepresentation.‘If 
the public believes the licensor to exercise quality control over licensed products then it 
becomes more plausible that a misrepresentation that the defendant is licensed will 
                                                 
140The second half of the ‘interface’ as referred to by Hobbs QC in the transcript of Court of Appeal hearing (day 1), as 
opposed to Rihanna's official Rihanna merchandise (the first half of the ‘interface’). 
141McCarthy n 18, 38 
142Jeremy Roberts, ‘Face off: Rihanna wins "image rights" case’(2013) 24(8) Ent LR 283, 283 
143Fentyn 6 [67]. Birss J dismissed this and referred to it as ‘striking’. 
144Douglas n 15 (Lord Nicholls) 72 
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influence its choice.’145Notwithstanding this, as Hobbs QC submitted, can quality control 
really be exercised by a super star and is the mere collection of royalties sufficient for the 
purpose of establishing a ‘relevant connection’?146 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Image Rights and English Law: a Glimmer of Hope 
The 22nd of January 2015 was asignificant day for highly successful, well-known retailers 
marketing celebrity-image clothing, but the judgement delivered in Court 65 of the Royal 
Courts of Justice may well have more wide-ranging implications. The decision of Birss J in 
Rihannawas thefirst of its kind. When the Lord Justices upheld it, a glimmer of hope for 
image rights protection under English law could be discerned. It is spawned through the 
assertion of undisclosed licenses.147It is a very limited right; it is fact-specific; it is not even 
described as an image right. We are reminded by Kitchin LJ that ‘[t]here is no "image right" 
or "character right" which allows a celebrity to control the use of his or her name or 
image’. 148  However, his Lordship does recognise the “piecemeal” protection that is 
available: ‘[a] celebrity seeking to control the use of his or her image must therefore rely on 
some other cause of action...’149Is this appropriate in England in 2015 having regard to the 
investment in celebrity culture, the internationalisation of entertainment, sport and fashion 
plus the tremendous value of merchandising and endorsement deals? 
 
 
 
                                                 
145 Wadlow, n 32 309 [5-020] 
146 Transcript of Court of Appeal hearing (day 1); Bollinger n 135; Harrods n 136 
147Hobbs QC in the transcript of Court of Appeal hearing (day 1) 
148Fenty (CA) n 7 [29] 
149ibid [33] 
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Uncertainty 
The consequence of lawyers having to resort to causes of action not designed with image 
rights protection in mind  results in theattempted“shoehorning” of image-related claims into 
ill-fitting shoes, yielding unpredictable results. Despite the evident, substantial commercial 
value of a celebrity's image,150 the uncertainty of the legal outcome is illustrated by the 
words of Underhill LJin the Court of Appeal judgement: ‘...I regard this case as close to the 
borderline.’151Whilst interesting for lawyers, the incremental evolution of image rights via 
the common law leads to speculation in relation to judicial interpretation of fact-specific 
cases. For stakeholders, especially retailers (like Topshop) and celebrity 
merchandising/endorsement companies(like those connected to Rihanna), it means delay, 
expense and uncertainty. For lawyers, it demands continued scrutiny of the nature and 
ambit of passing off in a modern setting. Is it the appropriate vehicle for preventing unfair 
competition more generally152 or should it be confined to deceptive practices? Moral and 
ethical questionsariseand it is difficult to reconcile the different interests of established 
traders, newcomers to market and consumers. 
 
 
Image Rights and Misappropriation: Unjust Enrichment 
The artificiality of relying on a miscellany of causes of action not designed to protect image 
rights also skews the evolution of torts such as passing off.The authors contend that the 
beauty of the tort is its versatility, but the price is the high evidential burden which only the 
                                                 
150For example,OK! magazine paid £1 millionto Michael Douglas and Catherine Zeta Jonesto publish authorised 
photographs of theirwedding: Douglas n 15 (Lord Nicholls) [243]. In the instant case, Rihanna reportedly sought 
damages to the sum of £3 million: Dorothea Thompson, ‘Rihanna and image rights’Law Gazette (3 Feb 2015, London) 
available at www.lawgazette.co.uk/law/legal-updates/rihanna-and-image-rights/5046507.article. Rihanna also 
succeeded in a £1.5 million claim against Topshop for her costs (Jordan Strauss, ‘Rihanna wins £1.5m costs from 
Topshop’ The Times (4 Feb 2015, London)  available at www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/life/celebrity/article4343626.ece) 
151Fenty(CA) n 7 (Underhill LJ) [63] 
152Akin to the general unfair competition laws (concurrence déloyale) of the French Civil Code (Arts 1382 and 1383) 
which can be used in conjunction with the notion “parisitisme” to prevent these types of parasitic commercial practices.  
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already successful are able to discharge. The outcome is also uncertain as ‘every case 
depends upon its own peculiar facts’ as well as the interpretations of the classical trinity 
elements by the judiciary. Some clearly favour an expansionist approach which others 
view with barely concealed contempt.153 
 
It will be interesting to see how Rihanna is considered in future claims for false 
endorsement or, indeed, false merchandise. 
 
 
 
Commercial Considerations 
During the appeal hearing, Hobbs QC produced a photograph of Rihanna wearing a top 
sold by Topshop featuring an image of Elizabeth Taylor as Cleopatra from the 1963 film. 
The snapshot was taken only one month before the star issued proceedings against the 
same high street store.154 The irony was not lost on the authors. Notwithstanding this, we 
think that the lack of sui generis image rights is bad for business.HobbsQC stated that 
Rihanna's original claim was generalised and unspecific: he compared its breadth to‘a 
barn door’.155This, in itself, illustrates the pressure courts are under to provide image rights 
protection. After all, the stakes are high. Even as this conclusion was being written, the 
magic of endorsement was illustrated when the children's author, JK Rowling, responded 
to a “Tweet” asking her to reveal her favourite brand of tea.156According to the director of 
                                                 
153L'Oreal n 60 (Jacob LJ) 
154Allen O, ‘Rihanna wearing a Topshop Pixelated Elizabeth Taylor Cleopatra Print Sweater by Unique’ Upscale Hype 
(27 Feb 2012) available at www.upscalehype.com/2012/02/rihanna-wearing-a-topshop-pixelated-elizabeth-taylor-
cleopatra-print-sweater-by-unique/ 
155Transcript of Court of Appeal hearing (day 1) 
156BBC News at Six programme broadcast at 18.00 hours on 9.2.2015 
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the company marketing the lucky brew, the company's daily website hits grew from 25 to 
over 4000 immediately following the correspondence.157 
 
It is worth remembering that England does not exist in isolation; its laws are influenced by 
international treaty obligations158 and European Union laws.159Against the single market 
hypothesis are barriers to trade, offering widely differing levels of protection to a person's 
attributes and widely differing perspectives in relation to unfair competition. 
 
 
Human Rights Considerations 
There are also the dignatarian arguments.  In his judgement,Birss J talks about Rihanna's 
'loss of control of her reputation’ under the third element of the classical trinity.160 Control 
over the use of one's image or reputation is bound up with human rights as recognised by 
Laddie J in Irvine.161Furthermore, private life, in the view of the European Court of Human 
Rights, includes a ‘person's physical and psychological integrity’;162 the guarantee afforded 
by Article 8 of the Convention is primarily intended to ensure the development, without 
outside interference, of the personality of each individual in his or her relations with other 
human beings.163Consequently, there is a 'zone of interaction'164 of a person with others, 
                                                 
157According to Paul Needham, Director of Lancashire Tea Supplies Ltd, who said he referred to analytical data in 
relation to the company's website: BBC News at Six programme broadcast at 18.00 hours on 9.2.2015 
158 Such as the International Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property ("Paris Convention"); see 10bis on 
Unfair Competition section 3 (3) which compels signatories to prohibit "indications or allegations the use of which in 
the course of trade is liable to mislead the public as to the nature, the manufacturing process, the characteristics, the 
suitability for their purpose, or the quantity, of the goods". 
159Such as Directive 2005/29/EC on Unfair Commercial Practices. 
160Fenty n 6 [74]. Although in support of Clive Lawrence’s continuum argument (n 34), the ‘loss of control’ could apply 
to all three elements of the classical trinity. 
161Irvine n 37 [77] 
162Botta v Italy, judgment of 24 February 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-I, 422, § 32.  
163 See:mutatis mutandis, Niemietz v Germany, judgment of 16 December 1992, Series A no. 251-B, 33, § 29; and Botta 
ibid 
164Von Hannover v Germany [2004] ECHR 294 [50] 
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even in a public context, which may fall within the scope of “private life”.165Yet the long 
standing reticence of the English courts is evident even in Rihanna: we are reminded 
that‘monopolies should not be so readily created’,166hence theextremely limited scope of 
the injunction.  
 
 
Practical Consequences for Rights Holders, Retailers and Consumers 
Post Rihanna, wise retailers will use indelible disclaimers to make it clear, where relevant, 
that their wares are not official or produced in collaboration with the artist;167 otherwise 
they will no doubt trumpet the tie-up from the rooftops.  
 
Celebrities ought not to turn away with ‘the chink of the distant till’ ringing in their ears.This 
expression was coined by the late Anthony Walton QC168 to indicate the receipt of royalties 
without supervisory control.169 In our view, it is difficult to prove that consumers will buy a 
product just because they think that royalties are being paid to the famous person depicted 
on merchandise (unless, perhaps,if it is associated with fund raising for charity).Therefore, 
it is vital that celebrities and rights holders exercise quality control over licensed 
merchandise to make it easier to prove material misrepresentation in relation to 
unauthorised products.At the very least, they should be on the lookoutfor the lack of the 
above disclaimers and refer to this case as a precedent for protecting the 
goodwillappurtenant to a famous name or image. Even where there are disclaimers, we 
believe they can be challenged on the basis of the reasoning in Arsenal. 
 
                                                 
165 See:mutatis mutandis, PG and JH v the United Kingdom, no. 44787/98, § 56, ECHR 2001-IX; and Peck v the United 
Kingdom, no. 44647/98, § 57, ECHR 2003-I  
166Kitchin citing Elvis n 53 (Lord Simon) 598; see also:Wadlow discussion concerning the ‘evils’ of monopoly,n 61 447  
167Note the authors’ caveat above in the light Arsenal n 110 and Asprey n 112 
168Latterly of Hogarth Chambers, London 
169Elvis n 53 (Lord Simon) 598 
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For fans wanting to purchase official merchandise: they should listen out for the trumpeting 
of authentication or, at the very least, the ‘chink of a distant till’.170In their absence, they 
should check the label. But, what of the extension of the tort in Irvine and Rihanna? 
Passing off has been described as ‘harness[ing] the self-protective energy of competitors 
to the protection of consumers’.171 Paradoxically, the extension may work to the detriment 
of consumers in terms of higher prices and less choice of merchandise. 
 
 
Rihanna is of paramount importance, yet it leaves as much unanswered as it does settled 
in relation to image rights protection in England. This article suggests that by the upholding 
of the first instance decisionby the Court of Appeal, image rightsare advancing ever closer 
into English law and conversely, the more successful the user/owner of such right, the 
more likely infringement.Whilst the arguments for and against sui generis image rights 
protection (both philosophical and pragmatic) rage on, the pecuniary value of a famous 
persona and the commercial reality of licensing and endorsement contracts demand 
greater protection against misappropriation. However, passing off may not be the 
appropriate means to achieve this if you subscribe to the narrower interpretation of the 
classical trinity supported by Jacob and Carty. 
 
Effective image protection willalso require law makers to reconcile the commodification of 
real human beingswith their dignitary rights, including their autonomy and privacy as 
broadly defined by the European Court of Human Rights in Von Hannover.172After all, 
image may be everything173 but, without protection, it is nothing. 
 
                                                 
170Transcript of Court of Appeal hearing (day 1) 
171 W R Cornish, ‘The International Relations of Intellectual Property’ CLJ (1993) 52(1) 46, 53 
172Von Hannover n 164 [50] 
173Based on the Canon slogan "Image is everything" used in the 1990 advertising campaign in which professional tennis 
player, Andre Agassi, endorsed Canon cameras, but was criticised for endorsing style over substance. The video is 
available on YouTube at http://youtu.be/WpuFEpbE0d0 
